Berkeley and the Justification of Beliefs

Abstract

Berkeley wants to say something about scepticism and the 'principles of human knowledge' in his main works, as if he were an epistemologist by inclination. When one reads the actual texts this opinion may well change: not much is said about knowledge and belief. However, the problems of evidence and epistemic justification are considered, mainly in connection with the problems of the external world. What is matter and whether we have any contact with spatiotemporal bodies are the problems which drove Berkeley to write his Principles and Three Dialogues.' My purpose is to focus on such epistemic issues as the justification of our beliefs concerning the various types of entities in Berkeley's philosophical universe. I suggest that we explicate 'knowledge' according to the so called 'classical definition' and pay attention to the possibility of belief formation concerning different types of epistemic objects. The 'classical definition of knowledge' is this: Knowledge is true and justified belief. The problem of belief formation is here understood, firstly, to be roughly the question of whether any such belief that qualifies as both true and justified/certain can also be formed in one's mind. It is the question about a reliable connection between the mind and the world. Sec-