Bergmann's Constituent Ontology

Abstract

Gustav Bergmann's recent book, Realism,, is divided into two 'books'. Book One, entitled Facts, Things, Ideas, consists of an exposition of some facets of Bergmann's own ontological thought. Book Two, entitled and Meinong, consists of an exposition of the ontologies of Franz Brentano and Alexius Meinong. Book One, in turn, is subdivided into two parts, the first called General Ontology, and the second, Representationalism. I wish, in this review, to discuss some features of Bergmann's general ontology. I shall thus be concentrating my attention on the first part of the first 'book' of the book before us. In order to come to understand this, however, I shall enlist the aid of other recent ontological writings by Bergmann. Coming to understand is a problem of major dimensions in dealing with the writings of Bergmann. Partly this is because of the difficulty of the issues under consideration. Mostly, though, it is due to the extraordinarily idiosyncratic and mannered style which Bergmann uses to present his thoughts-a style fractured, elliptic, and involuted. The philosophical world is scarcely ablaze with discussion of Bergmann's ontology. In good measure, the blame for this must be laid to the style with which the ontology is presented. Bergmann regards his espousal of the bare particular as one of the most significant and innovative features of his philosophy. I do not myself regard it as the most innovative. Bergmann's concept of the particular is representative of a long philosophical tradition; and his claim that certain entities, including particulars, are bare, is, as I shall argue, as traditional and commonplace as any philosophical doctrine could possibly be. I also do not regard Berg-