Abstract
The acceptability of the Nash Social Welfare Function is questioned because a minute (perhaps hardy perceivable) welfare change of someone with a very low welfare level might overwhelm enormous welfare changes of others. The axiomatic derivation of the Nash SWF by Kaneko and Nakamura is analyzed. Arguments for and against social welfare as separable in, linear in, and an unweighted sum of individual welfares are critically discussed. Separability follows from the individualistic ethics (Fleming, Sugden and Weale). Linearity follows from the ‘logic’ of rational choice in the face of risk (Harsanyi). (Diamond's counter‐example is rejected.) Unweighted sum follows from either (i) informational restriction precluding interpersonal comparison of welfare levels (D'Aspremont and Gevers, Maskin); or (ii) with finite sensibility, equation of just‐perceivable increments of welfare across persons (Edgeworth) or the Weak Majority Preference Criterion (Ng).
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
