BENNION'S STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Abstract

For many years, statutory interpretation, dubbed a non-subject by Lord Wilberforce, has not attracted the same jurisprudential attention as the methodology of the common law. The study of legal methods may seem arid ground for fruitful reflection and may not appear a lively source of issues for critical thought. In part, this is the result of the technical, rule-centred way in which legal methods have been presented. Like the rules of grammar to those who use a language, they appear things to be known, rather than to be dwelt upon. In part also, there is the problem of the sheer width of the subject. From the non-legal side, the subject needs to incorporate material from both the philosophy of language and from constitutional theory. From the legal perspective, it requires a survey of techniques used in a wide variety of legal topics, which is daunting to any but the Herculean mind. Despite these difficulties for any writer, the subject surely repays careful study at a time when most of the difficult cases coming to appellate courts involve some element of statutory interpretation and most of legal practice involves the application and interpretation of statutes. Like any aspect of legal methodology, statutory interpretation can be approached from a number of perspectives. Legal approaches may concentrate on isolating the kinds of argument which will succeed in court, or a repertoire of possible arguments, or simply to enable lawyers to read texts intelligently. Such approaches may seem far from linguistic philosophy or political theory which would study the same subject-matter with different objectives in mind. All the same, any 'legal' approach will take for granted a certain set of presuppositions about how words derive their meaning and about the constitutional role of the judge in the process of statutory interpretation. From the point of view of both practical value and legal theory, it is important that these presuppositions are adequately expressed and integrated into a work on legal methodology, particularly on statutory interpretation. Francis Bennion's Statutory Interpretation' sets out to be a major work in the field. This is not only shown by its size (854 pages plus appendices), and by its price (a staggering ?85), but also by the objective which it sets itself. It aims to provide a Code of the current principles governing the construction of Acts and other legislative instruments in English law, and to provide a critical commentary on them (p. xxviii). It claims to be usable by readers at all levels and provides them with a guide on how to use it. However, closer analysis suggests that the book is more unconventional in its structure than in its objectives. We are presented with