Benhabib and Rawls's Hypothetical Contractualism

Abstract

In Situating the Self Seyla Benhabib addresses the question: what is living and what is dead in universalist moral and political theories?1 Her answer is that what is living is a particular version of communicative ethics. Like Jiirgen Habermas, Benhabib argues that the conditions of an ideal speech situation entail strong ethical assumptions. First, they require that we recognize the right of all beings capable of speech and action to be participants in moral conversations. Second, they require that within such conversations each has the same symmetrical rights to various speech acts, to initiate new topics, to ask for reflection about the presuppositions of the conversation, etc. The first requirement Benhabib calls the principle of moral respect. The second requirement she calls the principle of egalitarian reciprocity. According to Benhabib, these two principles together with the basic principle of discourse ethics which is that only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all concerned in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse serve as an adequate universalizability test for moral judgments. Passing this test is said to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for generating morally valid judgments.2 Benhabib wants to distinguish her version of communicative ethics from the hypothetical contractualism of John Rawls as well as defend it against criticisms that have been raised by communitarians, feminists,