Abstract
This paper briefly examines certain aspects of the traditional concept of federalism and the relation of these elements to contemporary cooperative federalism. It contends that both the dual and cooperative concepts are narrowly constructed on the autonomy dimension of state-national relations. It advocates a more explicit conceptualization of state-national relations, and illustrates the profitability of this position by an interest group formulation. The paper isolates fiscal benefits and policy preferences which individual states secure in their intergovernmental relations and demonstrates that a trade-off of policy and fiscal benefits takes place at a -.48 level. In conclusion, the paper suggests that state policy strategies, functional government, characteristics of the national administration and autonomy are all questions that can be illuminated by an interest-group formulation of state-national relations.
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