Abstract
Aiming at the stability problem of the technological innovation cooperation alliance formed by multiple enterprises, the cooperative game theory is used to analyze the benefit distribution mechanism of technological innovation cooperation among enterprises. Based on the amount of resources invested by enterprises in technological innovation cooperation alliances, a profit model for enterprise technological innovation cooperation is constructed. According to the Shapley value method, a profit distribution mechanism that can maintain a stable cooperative relationship is proposed, which is explicitly explained by application examples. We find that when the synergic coefficient of cooperation between enterprises is not less than 0, each enterprise can increase the benefits of technological innovation through cooperative alliances. The benefit distribution mechanism of the Shapley value method can maintain the stability of enterprise technological innovation cooperation alliance. The enterprises who participate in the alliance can make targeted resource investment decisions based on different parameters through our analytical analysis. Our results show that these parameters, namely the contribution coefficient and degree of the synergetic effect have positive affect on the benefits to the enterprises in the alliance, while the cost coefficient of invested resources has negative affect on the benefits to the enterprises in the alliance.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
