Benchmark Beating and Earnings Manipulation in Nigerian Firms

Abstract

Earnings management among firms remains a central focus for academics, auditors and regulatory bodies. Benchmark-motivated earnings management occurs when managers engage in opportunistic activities, including flexible use of accounting standards to misrepresent the information in a firm’s financial reports. Academic research has focused on how firms manage earnings to beat benchmarks, but the evidence regarding firms in emerging African stock markets is scarce and none is available for Nigeria. We applied both accruals quality and discretionary accruals models to detect whether firms that beat earnings benchmarks report earnings differently from others. Using 161 firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange from 2002 to 2019, the study verifies how benchmark beaters manage earnings under the framework of two earnings thresholds – earnings (level) and positive earnings changes. Earnings persistence tests were carried out to verify whether benchmark beaters are consistent manipulators relative to non-beaters. The findings indicate that positive earnings benchmarks differ among the dichotomized groups. The evidence is not sufficient to validate that the change in earnings benchmarks motivates earnings discretions. However, the evidence may improve for larger samples. The study offers insights for informed decisions on the expectation of investment returns for investors, creditors, and other market partakers that require earnings information.