Below-Replacement Fertility in Japan: Patterns, Factors, and Policy Implications

Abstract

Japan has experienced two fertility transitions, the first a decline from high to the replacement level of about 2.1 children per woman shortly after World War II and the second a decline since the mid-1970s from replacement to very low total fertility rates (TFR) of 1.3–1.4 children per woman. While the first transition stemmed primarily from declining rates of childbearing among married couples, the second transition has been related almost entirely to the postponement of marriage and childbearing. And it now looks like substantial numbers of Japanese women and men will never marry and will remain childless. Improved education and labor-market opportunities for young women, combined with decreasing regular employment for young men, is likely leading to the postponement or avoidance of marriage. In addition, the combination of rising economic opportunities in the workplace and unequal gender relations at home make the traditional marriage package particularly unattractive for young Japanese women. Concerned about very low fertility and rapid population aging, the Japanese government has introduced various family policies and programs since the early 1990s. These consist of three major components: (1) childcare services; (2) parental leave schemes; and (3) monetary assistance in the form of child allowances. Despite these efforts, Japan’s family policy appears to have been largely ineffective in the sense that strains, especially on working mothers, have not been alleviated and fertility has remained very low.