Abstract
This chapter outlines an expressivist account of the meaning of normative sentences, according to which normative sentences express higher-order (or relational) states of being in certain kinds of complex states consisting of both desire-like states (or ‘pro-attitudes’) and non-normative beliefs. First, this kind of higher-order state view or higher-order state expressivism (cf. relational expressivism) is introduced (section 1). It is then argued that this view can exploit the resources that ecumenical expressivism is sometimes supposed to have for dealing with the Frege–Geach problem (section 2), and yet avoid the problems with the ecumenical view regarding validity, expression relation, and normative disagreement (sections 3, 4, and 5).
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