Belief, Linguistic Behavior, and Propositional Content

Abstract

In this paper, I present solutions to four related problems for the Millian Theory of the meaning of proper names. These solutions are based on a new view about the connections among belief, linguistic behavior and propositional content, and on a hypothesis about the kinds of beliefs we reason from when we reason from our beliefs. In section I, I state several assumptions that guide this effort. In section II, I present three rival views about the connections among belief, linguistic behavior and propositional content. In section III, I review the four problems to be solved: the problem of significant (or non-trivial) true, identity sentences; the problem of apparent failures of the substitutivity of codesignating names in propositional attitude contexts; and two problems raised by Kripke's puzzle about belief.' In section IV, I state and explain my hypothesis about the kinds of beliefs we reason from when we reason from our beliefs. In section V, I present solutions to the four problems.