Abstract
As usually presented the thesis that a belief is a disposition to act1 has two virtues and three defects. It is a clear improvement over the Humean thesis that a belief is a lively idea, and it appears to be of considerable relevance for psychological doctrine and theories of rational inference.2 Unfortunately, there is the debit side. ‘Disposition to’ is not always clearly explicated, nor is the philosophical problem which the thesis is intended to solve always explicit. And when it is, concomitant philosophical gain seems slight. But despite these ills the thesis calls not for abandonment but for reinterpretation which we shall attempt to supply after we document our complaints and indicate what we take to be legitimate sources of puzzlement and the ways of their removal.
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