Belief, Acceptance, and Knowledge

Abstract

The distinction to which L. Jonathan Cohen draws our attention,1 between belief and what he calls 'acceptance', is I believe (and accept) a real one, however much it is ignored or blurred, not only by native speakers of natural languages but also by philosophers (cf. p. 368). Cohen also shows us that the distinction is philosophically fertile and indeed helpful in trying to understand the implications of certain kinds of speech act, and in the explanation of purposive action. But my particular concerns are with what he says about belief and acceptance in regard to scientific knowledge; more particularly, with his attempts to show that science can provide counter-examples to the philosophical theory that knowledge involves belief-the 'entailment' thesis, which Cohen once held, I believe;2 and finally and especially with his attempted refutation of my earlier attempt to show that knowledge does not always involve belief.3 So, Cohen writes, (ibid., p. 385) 'Ideally ... a scientist would dispense altogether with belief in the truth of his favoured hypotheses and rest content with accepting them'. That is to say, having decided 'to have or adopt a policy of deeming, positing, or postulating that p-that is, of going along with the proposition (either for the long term or for immediate purposes only) as a premiss in some or all contexts for his own and others' proofs, argumentations, inferences, deliberations, etc.' (p. 368) he does not thereby believe it. For belief is an involuntary mental act, if indeed it is an act at all, according to Cohen. He describes it as a feeling, which you do not decide to have but discover that you have or do not have by 'introspecting or [and?] reporting' a disposition (p. 368, my brackets). Of course, if beliefs were only feelings whose presence were determined only by introspection, we could not discover that we are wrong about what we believe, as we sometimes do, namely by noticing-perhaps as a result of having this vigorously pointed out to us by those who know us well-incongruities between what we profess about our feelings and how we carry on; and we should be forever in the dark about what the inarticulate believe. Moreover, if beliefs are involuntary, as they do appear to be, then there is, at least prima facie, something paradoxical in speaking, as Cohen does, of scientists-and indeed anyone or anything else which has (and holds) these involuntary feelings-dispensing with them. There is even a hint of paradox in speaking or justifying them if they are involuntary feelings. I do not mean to suggest that Cohen has simply invented these difficulties, for they do occur, or that nothing can be done by way of resolving them. But I do say