Abstract

This paper argues against the priority of temporality over spatiality, which Heidegger defends in Being and Time. The argument, however, does not follow the turn in Heideggers philosophy and his later retrieval of the spatial, but is developed as a delimitation that is, an internal critique and reconstruction undertaken within the transcendental framework of his early thinking. This delimitation proposes a demonstration of the fundamental role of spatialising, defined as dissemination, in the constitution of human Being-in-the-world. A rethinking of human Being-there in terms of the co-originality of spatiality and temporality permits a revisiting of the question of the transcendental and makes it possible to pursue the overcoming of a philosophy of the subject which, critics often point out, Heidegger unsuccessfully sought to transgress in his early work.

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