Abstract

of China's most difficult problems is how best to deal with Tibetans in China and in exile. The likelihood of this problem being resolved externally through a negotiated settlement with the Dalai Lama has become increasingly remote, while internally, Tibetan nationalistic demonstrations have been on the rise. Externally, Beijing's options have been limited, because the Dalai Lama's demand for a One Country, Two Systems type of autonomy, namely, for a different political system for all Tibetans in China, is beyond anything that Beijing will accept, and conversely, because the Dalai Lama is unwilling to accept lesser forms of autonomy. Internally, Beijing's options have also been constrained by its unwillingness, for what it considers security reasons, to address the politico-religious grievances of many Tibetans in China, for example by lifting all restrictions on monasteries and giving Tibetans greater control in their autonomous region. As a result, the government of China has opted to resolve the issue internally by prioritizing modernization and economic development in Tibet as a means of linking Tibet inextricably with the rest of China, while also inculcating loyalty by showing Tibetans that being part of the PRC is in their short- and long-term material interests. This economic strategy also allows China to respond to international criticism by showing that living conditions in Tibet are good and improving. The first Lhasa riots of 1987-89 led to a year of martial law and shocked Beijing, which after 1980 had adopted a conciliatory ethnic policy, for example allowing monasteries to reopen as places of study and worship. China responded to them in a variety of ways, including a strategy of development and modernization during its 9th and 10th Five-Year Plans (1996-2000; 2001-05).2 The 10th Five-Year Plan invested 31.2 billion yuan (US$4.2 billion) for 117 projects aimed at rapidly enhancing development and infrastructure in Tibet, the emphasis being on economic growth and GDP.3 Much of this investment derived from China's Develop the West Campaign (xibu da kaifa Hns % JF ^:). This campaign was intended to reduce economic inequality and thereby defuse political tensions among the ethnic minority inhabitants ofthe nation's western regions.4 External authences, however, have questioned the effectiveness of Beijing's large investments in development in Tibet. They have argued that Tibetans, especially the 82 per cent of them who live in mral areas, have benefited only marginally, if at all, and that most of the gains have gone disproportionately to non-Tibetan Han and Hui who have flocked into Tibet as economic migrants to avail themselves of the new opportunities.5 The Tibetan government-in-exile, for example, issued a report that argued: The Western Development strategy [of the 10th Five-Year Plan] gives little priority to investment in local agriculture and livestock, although the majority of the western population, especially non-Chinese ethnic populations experiencing the most acute poverty, are in these two sectors ... State economic development efforts so far have not affected the Tibetans, particularly in the mral areas in Tibet, in a positive way. Hence, it cannot be assumed that mral Tibet is progressing or that development is inevitable.6 Similarly, a recent article on contemporary Tibet criticized China's development policy for marginalizing Tibetans: Because of the rosy picture painted by official statistics and the state media, most Chinese are unaware that Tibetans have been among the big losers in the course of China's economic miracle, and that within Tibetan areas (both the Tibet Autonomous Region and Tibetan autonomous prefectures in the neighboring provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan), the pace of economic modernization has polarized Tibet's economy. While a minority of Tibetans have been rewarded with state jobs, the majority of Tibetans, who are poorly equipped to access new economic opportunities, have been marginalized. …

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