Behind the FulgurationsThe Evolution of Cognition. Edited by C. Heyes and L. Huber. Cambridge and Bradford: MIT Press, 2000.

Abstract

The Evolution of Cognition, the product of a 1998 workshop held at the Konrad Lorenz Institute, commences with confidence and optimism. In the first few pages we read that this book “is better integrated and more authoritative than is typical for conference volumes” and that it will provide “a natural history of human knowledge.” Stakes of this kind attract one’s attention and raise one’s expectations. Nineteen contributions from the various corners of cognitive science, including philosophy, psychology, biology, and anthropology, are organized into six sections, each introduced by a thoughtful editorial preface. Each chapter has its own summary and reference list and is cross-referenced to other chapters. The first section contains contributions to basic problems of cognitive science ranging from the proper use of the term “evolutionary psychology” to a debate on what exactly “counts” as a cognitive process, and the reader soon realizes how heterogeneous the field still is. Dichotomous views about what constitutes a cognitive process clash with multilateral ones (associative learning/ conceptual thought versus a dozen or more distinct processes). The editors offer some reconciliation by noting that identifying the exact demarcation lines of cognition may be less interesting than pursuing its evolutionary history. The modularity issue, raised next, remains equally unsettled. Its proponents suggest that subsets of special-purpose devices that allegedly make up the human mind can be found in animals from paramecia to humans. Natural selection has acted on each one, resulting in specializations, combinations, or additions, and this calls for a broad comparative approach. Its rival, the general-process theory, suggests that all that matters is the universal laws of learning, even in cases where individuals make behavioural decisions seemingly based on insight. Again the editors offer some reconciliation by noting that cognition could be carved simultaneously along two different dimensions: content (e.g., snake fear, spatial maps) and processing principles (e.g., associative learning, same-different categorization).