Behavior of prosumers in Smart Grid: A comparison of Net Energy Metering and Billing Schemes, and Game Theory-based Local Electricity Market

Abstract

Net energy metering (NEM) and net energy billing (NEB) are the most commonly used self-consumption schemes for prosumers in countries around the world. The concept of the local electricity market (LEM) is emerging as the potential successor of the self-consumption schemes, with several already implemented pilot projects. The comparative study of prosumers’ behavior in terms of optimal economic self-dispatching under NEM, NEB, and game-theory-based LEM energy policies is performed in this paper. The non-cooperative game-theoretic methodology is used for the calculation of Nash–Cournot equilibrium which is adopted as an LEM clearing mechanism. The prosumers’ daily energy patterns (generation, consumption, and storage) and payoffs are analyzed. Diversities of prosumers’ assets (distributed energy resources (DERs) and storage devices) and load profiles are considered. The distribution utility’s role is considered in terms of its own payoff for supplying the necessary energy to ensure the power balance equation. The numerical analysis is performed using the model of the benchmark test distribution network IEEE 33-node. The obtained results are discussed in terms of the correlation between prosumers’ behavior and the adopted energy policy. The strengths and weaknesses of the most common energy policies are highlighted from the prosumers’ perspective. The obtained results confirm that the transition from NEM to NEB self-consumption scheme could provide a better payoff to prosumers with dispatchable DERs under variable electricity price for excess energy produced. The residential prosumers equipped with SDs or dispatchable DERs were able to achieve the best payoffs in the case of Game Theory-based LEM.