Abstract

The mixed traffic flow has an increasingly impact on the operation of urban traffic. To study the evolution law of multi-group behaviors in pedestrian crossing, we used the evolutionary game theory to establish a multi-group behavior evolution model for pedestrian crossing. The process of concern started from the risk perception and multi-group behavior choice. The evolutionary stability strategies, evolution trends, and factors affecting the evolutionary path of multi-group behaviors are discussed in this paper. This study found that evolutionary strategy equilibrium of pedestrians, drivers, and traffic managers not only relied on their own earning, but also on those of the other two groups. The factors affecting its behavior included the revenue factor and the limiting factor. Evolutionary game theory was used to analyze the multi-group interaction behavior of pedestrians, vehicle drivers, and traffic managers in the process of pedestrian crossing, as well as to analyze the behavior of traffic subjects in the process of pedestrian crossing. This paper provides a basis for decision-making for the traffic management department to manage road traffic, offering a new idea from the perspective of evolution for solving the conflict of interest at the crosswalk of the road section.

Highlights

  • In view of the fact that traffic participants such as pedestrians, vehicle drivers, and traffic managers have a very important influence on the state of urban traffic, their behavior has become the focus of research at home and abroad

  • To analyze the multi-group game of pedestrian crossing, we developed the cross-street scenario of this model as follows: at the intersection, there are traffic managers who are supervising and pedestrians who may violate the rules in order to save crossing time

  • From the above theoretical analysis, we find that pedestrians, vehicle drivers, and traffic managers have different evolutionary trends

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Summary

Introduction

Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Previous studies were conducted from the perspectives of group behavior characteristics [2,3,4,5,6], behavioral simulation [7,8], and behavioral psychology [9] of pedestrians, vehicle drivers, and traffic managers. In terms of behavioral psychology, studies have used statistical analysis methods to explain the behavioral mechanisms of pedestrians, vehicle drivers, and traffic managers under the guidance of social psychology, traffic psychology, and cognitive psychology [30]. Has research been conducted on the three-party multi-group interaction behavior of pedestrians, vehicle drivers, and traffic management personnel in the process of pedestrian crossing. The evolutionary game used in this paper can better analyze the evolution process, evolution law, and evolution path of traffic subject behavior in the process of pedestrian crossing from the perspective of evolution.

Scenario Recurrence and Hypothesis
Multi-Group Behavior Evolution Dynamic Replication Equation
Analysis of Behavior Evolution Trend Based on Equilibrium Point
Result
Sensitivity Analysis
Behavioral Dynamic Evolution Graph
Behavior Evolution Path Analysis Based on Sensitivity Simulation
Simulation diagram of traffic managers’
Simulation
Simulation diagram of driver time revenue generated by by drivers’
Full Text
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