Abstract

This article investigates changes in the preference concerning restrictions on minority foreign ownership of equities among powerful groups of domestic asset holders in Russia. In three episodes between 1992 and 2006, local business interests opposed the easing of the rules for minority foreign ownership while they competed for control over disputed assets. Once they gained outright control of those assets, the winning groups began favoring lowering the barriers to portfolio investment inflows that would allow them to access liquidity and investment, and also aid their efforts to legitimize ownership rights. This account of financial integration in Russia suggests that domestic economic elites change their preferences with respect to financial openness policies depending on the outcome of ongoing contests for control over the relevant assets. Scholars of financial globalization in developing and emerging market economies should consider how contestability of property rights in the absence of the rule of law can influence the preferences of key domestic groups toward policies that enable or restrict the process of financial internationalization.

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