Beckett's Humour, from an Ethics of Finitude to an Ethics of the Real

Abstract

This article explores the ethics of Samuel Beckett's humour. It takes issue with the dominant reading of Beckettian humour as the redemption of a negativity occasioned by humanity's finitude. The paradigmatic case in point is here taken to be Simon Critchley's account, wherein ethics is cast as a process of coming to terms with disappointment ensuing from the inaccessibility of the Kantian Thing-in-Itself. This article takes up a Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective to recast Beckett's humour as, far from offering solace for finitude, highlighting instead the excess or remainder that insists, and resists philosophy's attempts to sublate it into a version of the Good. As such, the ethical demand evoked by Beckettian humour is not the attenuation of the disappointing lack implied by finitude, but rather a coping with the egregious excess of inhuman infinitude.