Beaumont v. Federal Election Commission: A Pre-Cursor of More Important Things to Come?

Abstract

255 WITH THE ATTENTION OF MUCH OF THE POLITICAL WORLD—especially its campaign finance reform combatants—focused on the pending federal court litigation and expected Supreme Court review of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”),1 the Supreme Court on November 18, 2002, quietly granted certiorari in a little-noticed electionlaw case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Beaumont v. Federal Election Commission, No. 02-403. Although Beaumont involves the narrowly-drawn issue of whether the Federal Election Campaign Act’s ban on corporate contributions to federal candidates may constitutionally be applied to a nonprofit political advocacy corporation such as the plaintiff North Carolina Right to Life, the Court’s decision in this relatively obscure case could well turn out to be a harbinger of the Court’s ruling in the much-anticipated appeal over the constitutionality of the BCRA itself. At issue in Beaumont is the constitutionality of section 441b(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), along with two implementing regulations adopted by the Federal Election Commission, 11 C.F.R. §§ 114.2(b) and 114.10.2 Section 441b(a) makes it unlawful, inter alia, for “any corporation whatever, or any labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election” for federal office. Instead, FECA allows corporations and labor organizations to participate in the federal electoral process by permitting them to establish and administer a “separate segregated fund,” more commonly known as a political action committee or PAC, which may solicit funds for political purposes from the corporation’s or labor union’s stockholders, executive employees, and members, and which may in turn use the funds it receives to make either direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures in connection with federal elections. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b). On January 3, 2000, plaintiffs North Carolina Right to Life (“NCRL”), its officers, and an eligible voter (Christine Beaumont) filed suit against the Federal Election Commission (the “FEC” or “Commission”), challenging the constitutionality of FECA’s prohibitions on corporate independent expenditures and contributions both on their face and as applied to NCRL, a 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporation that