Abstract
We investigate Bayesian Nash implementation with side payments. It is familiar that Bayesian monotonicity, together with self selection is necessary and sufficient for full implementation. We introduce an easily verifiable condition, Condition 1, which is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity under strict self selection. We also introduce an informational condition called the no-consistent-deception condition, which is sufficient for Condition 1. We then show that the no-consistent-deception condition is very weak and conclude that Bayesian monotonicity holds generically. This is in contrast to the well-known negative result for complete information environments. Moreover, we extend virtual implementation to Bayesian environments. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 025, 026.
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