Abstract

Abstract : This monograph examines the current readiness of the U. S. Army to conduct battlefield deception operations at the tactical level. The development of sophisticated intelligence collection systems and the automation of analysis has resulted in the need for deception in moderate warfare. At present the U. S. Army is re-evaluating its focus on deception and determining what capabilities are needed into the next century. The study begins with a synopsis of deception theories to establish criteria to determine the proper foundation of which deception capabilities should be based on. It proceeds with a historical review and analysis of U. S. Army deception operations and experience from the Revolutionary War to the present. Next, it examines current U. S. Army tactical deception capabilities and evaluates this capability within the framework of leadership and education, doctrine, organizational structure, and the military decision making process. The final sections examine future implications on the use of deception on twenty first century battlefields and provides conclusions and recommendations based on the research presented. This monograph concludes that the U. S. Army is inadequately prepared to conduct battlefield deception at the tactical level. This paper proposes recommendations that would restore sufficient capability within the U. S. Army divisional structure in order to conduct successful deception operations.

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