Battle for Budapest: One Hundred Days in World War II by Krisztián Ungváry Ladislaus Löb (review)

Abstract

REVIEWS 775 Ungvary, Kriszti'an.Battlefor Budapest.OneHundred Days in WorldWarII. Translatedby LadislausLob. I. B. Tauris,London and New York,2003. xviii + 366 pp. Maps. Illustrations.Tables.Notes. Bibliography.Indexes. /29.50. SOMEextremities are more extreme than others, and the bounds of human atrocity and endurance displayed during the hundred days describedby this history are possibly unsurpassed by other episodes on the Eastern Front. Occurringat a time when the resultof the warin Europewas hardlyin doubt, the assaultof Budapestby the oncoming Soviet and Romanian forces did not attract the same attention as the earlier sieges of Leningrad and Stalingrad. Nevertheless, for ghastlinessit was in the same class, and it has importance in terms of military history. The book under review does justice to the victims (all too many), heroes (all too few) and morons (more than enough) of this long battle, and has appeared in several Hungarian and German versions previous to this edition, which is superblytranslatedfrom the German. This reviewer, who is not a specialist in military history, ventures to suggest that this is one of the outstanding accounts to emerge from World War II, integrating well-researchedcampaign narrativewith eye-witness details that provide a very human foregroundto events. The bulk of the book is devoted to military action, although there are gripping sections about civilian life. The movement and counter-movement of army units can often be wearisome for all but war-gamers,but the author has succeeded in lightening the narrativewith quotations from participants. Some readerswill prefer the last chapter, dealing with the internal life of the city and containing, among other things, eye-witnessobservationsof how the Russian soldiersand the Russian occupation authoritiesbehaved. The start of the battle may be taken as 28 October I944, when one of Stalin'simpracticalimperativesordered the capture of Budapestin five days. When the battle began the sub-FascistArrow Cross movement was firmlyin control, Admiral Horthy having been overthrown when he showed signs of reluctanceto continue the alliancewith Germany.The Hungariancommand, Hitler's nominal ally, had little say in what happened to its capital. The more cunning Hungarian commanderskept two sets of unit figures,an understated fighting strength tally that was sent to the German command, and an overstated ration strength that was sent to the supply services. Numerous Hungarian officersand men found ways of going over to the Russians, so in the later combats Hungarians could be found fighting on both sides. Those who deserted to the Russians were given the choice of fighting alongside the latter(who usuallytreatedthem decently althoughassigningthem to the more suicidaltasks),or allocationto detention campsof doubtfulsurvivability.Mass desertionsby whole units were frustratedeither by betrayalby fellow officers or by the arrestof Hungarian officer-negotiatorsby paranoid Soviet security men. Everythingseemed mixed up. There were other Hungarian troops (and resistance groups) which tried to fight their compatriots in the Arrow Cross while refrainingfrom attackson Germans. There were Russian auxiliariesin the German units, some fighting voluntarily but others under compulsion. There were German SS units which, contrary to popular impression, had 776 SEER, 82, 3, 2004 negligible fighting value (one such unit, an artillery battalion, consisted of Ukrainians wearing Polish uniforms to which German insignia had been sewn). There were Hungarian priests who were distinctly evil, encouraging the ArrowCrossin its atrocities,and a few who were heroicallyhumane. Large-scale cruelties, some accidental and some deliberate, were generalized . The Germanswere relativelyhumane, and often intervenedto saveJews from the murderousArrowCrossmilitia. Rape and murderaccompanied the Russian entry in the city, and continued for some weeks into the occupation. But there were also frequent instances of humane effortsat all levels of the Red Army. Many German soldiers preferred suicide to capture by the Russians, and so did a few Hungarians. The bulk of the city's inhabitants, however, saw the Russiansas a lesserevil than the ArrowCross, but the local Communistswere cruellydisappointed. The German commander was unfitfor thejob, spent his time safelyunder cover, and did not find the courage to defy Hitler and ordera break-outuntil it was too late. The attemptedbreak-out,in which massesof refugeesmingled with troopsin the darkstreetsto createa maddened horde thatwasmercilessly shelled and machine-gunned, was perhapsthe most gruesomeevent in a siege thatwas repletewith horror. Apartfrom secondarysources,mainly Hungarian and German, the author has done...