Basic Rights

Abstract

Chapter 6 analyzes how Schmitt applied his state and constitutional theory to Weimar. It shows Schmitt theorized a “counter-constitution” that entrenched liberal basic rights absolutely against democratic amendment procedures. It challenges the belief that Schmitt was a “relentlessly” illiberal thinker. This chapter analyzes how Schmitt applied his thought to Weimar in opposition to the prevailing positivist interpretation of the constitution, which held that it committed above all to democratic equal chance. Schmitt argued that the “absolute” commitments of a liberal democratic constitution like Weimar’s could only be coherently located in basic liberty rights. This chapter also analyzes the institutions and mechanisms Schmitt theorized to guarantee these basic liberty rights, especially against democratic subversion. They include entrenchment of basic constitutional commitments, party bans, a “positive” vote of no confidence, and a stronger federal state. It concludes by analyzing Schmitt’s reflections on the improvements the Bonn Grundgesetz made to the Weimar Constitution.