Basic Particular in Strawson’s Individuals

Abstract

he idea of particular is one of the core areas of philosophical discussion, especially in metaphysics. The term particular is understood from three different angles, i.e. metaphysical, conceptual and linguistic. Peter Frederic Strawson in his Individuals dwells on the issue with emphasis on basic particulars and tries to defend that his foundationalism is based on giving identifying references to them for identification of particulars of another type. The sub-title of the book Individuals is ‘An essay in Descriptive metaphysics’ and its aim is to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world. Strawson was in quest of a descriptive metaphysics and ultimately he found ‘material bodies’ and ‘persons’ as basic particulars. Material bodies belong to a class of particular such that ‘as thing are, it would not be possible to make all the identifying references which we do not make to particulars of other classes, unless we make identifying references to particulars of that class, whereas it would be possible to make all the identifying references we do make to particulars of that class without making identifying reference to particulars of other class.’ With full regards to Strawson’s perception, in the commonsensical view, I would like to do an in depth analysis of conglomerates such as ‘Material Bodies’ and ‘Persons’.