Basic Beliefs, Easy Knowledge and the Problem of Warrant Transfer

Abstract

In Chapters 4 and 5 we sought to establish that perceptual beliefs are governed by evidential norms, in particular, that experiences can confer justification on the beliefs it gives rise to. These beliefs are regarded as basic because their justification derives not from other justified beliefs, but from the experiences that cause them. On some very plausible assumptions, this leads to the doctrine of basic knowledge (justification), namely, knowledge (justification) that an agent acquires from a certain source, even if he fails to know that the source is reliable. It has, however, been claimed that, on such theories, bootstrapping and closure allow us far too easily to acquire knowledge (justification) that seems unlikely under the envisaged circumstances. It has further been argued that closure arguments exploiting basic knowledge (justification) are not warrant-transmitting. In this chapter, after evaluating some of the well-known solutions to these problems, I offer a mixed view of the legitimacy of basic knowledge inferences while trying to provide novel explanations as to how contrary intuitions arise.