Based on reputation consistent strategy times promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

Abstract

As we all know, the reputation has important influence on individual’s decision-making. How to effectively and objectively measure reputation is very important in based-reputation evolutionary game theory. In this paper, a novel evolutionary mechanism for based on reputation consistent strategy times is proposed, in which the reputation income of each player is positive or negative related to its consistent strategy times for cooperation or defection at the initial moment of the current time step. The reward or punishment scheme of the proposed evolutionary mechanism is relatively consistent with the real world understanding of reputation. It’s especially worth pointing out that, when the player’s strategy state changes, the player can get reasonable and timely reward or punishment, which can better promote cooperation compared to existing reputation-based evolutionary mechanisms. Specifically, the proposed evolutionary mechanism has the following two advantages in the evolutionary systems. First, the player who has insisted on cooperation for a long time is not inclined to adopt defection, mainly because the cost of reputation is too high. In addition, the player who has long insisted on defection tends to adopt cooperation. This is mainly because the reputation of the player is easily restored from notoriety to general. Obviously, the above two points can effectively promote cooperation. Based on prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) model, simulation and analysis also show that the proposed evolutionary mechanism can better promote cooperation compared to the traditional evolutionary mechanism, and can also speed up the evolutionary process, especially when the reputation factor is large. Furthermore, we also find that the cooperation level enhances when consistent strategy times upper bound becomes larger.