Abstract
Abstract:A model in which firms bargain over a collusive price is presented. The structure of an industry affects not only the ability of firms to collude, but also the collusive price itself. Entry into an industry can therefore result in consumers paying a higher price, even if the entrant is as efficient as the incumbent firms.
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