Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

Vincent Anesi,Daniel J Seidmann

doi:10.1093/restud/rdv009

Abstract

Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron–Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This article studies an extension of the Baron–Ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees: In each of an infinite number of periods, the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy (which is, in turn, the default for the next period). The model provides a number of quite different predictions. (i) From a positive perspective, the key distinction turns on whether the quota is less than unanimity. In that case, patient enough players waste substantial shares of the pie each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria. In contrast, the unique Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs in a unanimity committee coincide with those in the corresponding Baron–Ferejohn framework. (ii) If players have heterogeneous discount factors then a large class of subgame perfect equilibria (including all Markov perfect equilibria) are inefficient.

Highlights

Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining in an ad hoc committee over the division of a single pie: players earn an exogenously fixed default payoff until the committee reaches an agreement, when negotiations end
We follow a literature initiated by Baron (1996) and Kalandrakis (2004) by studying a model which captures these dynamic aspects of policy making.' Each period begins with a default policy inherited from the previous period; and a player is randomly drawn to make a proposal which is voted up or down by the committee; if voted up, the proposal is implemented and becomes the new default; if voted down, the ongoing default is implemented and remains in place until the period
We describe a pure strategy no-delay SMPE in which each policy in a simple solution is proposed by some player, and no other policy is proposed after any history as a simple equilibrium

Summary

Introduction

Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining in an ad hoc committee over the division of a single pie: players earn an exogenously fixed default payoff until the committee reaches an agreement, when negotiations end. A pie is available for division each period; and this process continues ad infinitum. This model naturally represents Congressional legislation on social policy and entitlements: the previously agreed law remains in place until Congress decides to amend it.

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