Abstract
Communication is central for competition. In two sided markets, communication freedom is mainly represented by the ability for every agent in the economy to reach all the agents on the other side of the market without incurring any cost. However, not every competition environment has this symmetry or, in other words, this freedom. We construct a model in which homogeneous sellers simultaneously negotiate with buyers, who have different valuations, in the presence of communication restrictions represented by a network. We find that similar network structures may lead to different equilibrium outcomes. In our setting, not only positions of the agents in a network but also names of the agents who capture those positions are crucial for the equilibrium outcome.
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