Abstract
In the paper we deal with the comparison of the Shapley–Shubik index and Banzhaf–Coleman index in games with a coalition structure. We analyze two possible approaches in both cases: we calculate voters’ power in a composite game or we apply the modification of original indices proposed by Owen for games with a priori unions. The behavior of both indices is compared basing on the voting game with 100 voters and different coalition structures. We analyze changes of power (measured by means of BC index and SS index) implied by changes of the size and composition of coalition structures as well as by different methodology of measuring the voters’ power (composite game versus game with a priori unions).
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