Abstract
We examine the portfolio choice of banks in a micro-founded model of runs. To insure risk-averse investors against liquidity risk, competitive banks offer demand deposits. We use global games to link the probability of a run to the bank's portfolio management. Based upon interim information about risky investment, banks liquidate investments to hold a safe asset. This partial hedge against investment risk reduces the withdrawal incentives of investors for a given deposit rate. As a result, (i) banks provide more liquidity ex ante (so banks offer a higher deposit rate) and (ii) the welfare of investors increases. Our results highlight the management of both sides of a bank's balance sheet and a complementarity in the two forms of insurance that banks provide to investors.
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