Bank Indonesia and The Recent Crisis

Abstract

This paper is a personal note describing the crisis as it unfolded while the writer was a key player in Indonesia's macroeconomic management. The crisis is seen as multi-faceted. It originated externally from a shock in the currency market that triggered a downward spiral from currency depreciation to fully-fledged crisis. The currency shock that hit the rupiah in July 1997 exposed in sequence the flaws embedded in the banking sector, the economic system, the social and the political system, flaws that had been obscured by long years of good economic performance. Through a complicated process of contagion and feedback effects—market disturbances, policy responses and market reactions—Indonesia deteriorated from a relatively well managed economy to the “worst case” among the Asian crisis economies. The paper discusses this process, the IMF's role, the bank closure issue, the currency board controversy and the author's dismissal as Governor of Bank Indonesia.