Abstract
Low key rates hurt the profits of deposit-taking institutions in a differentiated Bertrand game if there is neither a tax on banknotes, nor a limit on its quantity, nor a reduction of its quality. By making the electronic dollar the unit of account and taxing paper currency, the central bank can escape the zero bound, optimize its seignorage and eliminate systematic profit shortfalls. By following a variant of Friedman's rule, the central bank can remove the market disruption of paper currency. The average rate paid in Nash's unique equilibrium is then bounded from above and below by measures of concentration.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
