Bangladesh: The Limits of a Developmental Welfare State under Governance Dysfunction

Abstract

Bangladesh portrays the image of a developmental welfare state, as reflected in the country’s Constitution and in numerous official policy documents including the successive Five-Year Plans. The implementation of the policies and programmes, however, has to contend with a serious problem of governance dysfunction, as the country is rated very poorly according to most global indicators of political and economic governance. Yet, somewhat paradoxically, the state appears to deliver on many of the welfare promises, as witnessed in the remarkable achievements in human development indicators and reduction in poverty levels taking place during the last two decades or so. In this paper, we try to explain this paradox in respect of the effectiveness of welfare-oriented policies like ensuring food security and provisioning of public services and social protection. In doing so, we look at the underlying political incentives and accountability mechanisms, while pointing to the limits of further progress under governance constraints. The paper does not, however, deal with the broader question of how governance impacts on the welfare of the poor through the mediation of the links between governance and the overall economic performance of the country.