Bandwagoning to dampen suspicion: NATO and the US-Japan Alliance after the Cold War

Abstract

The question of why alliances endure in the post‐Cold War period has been the center of much attention in the past decade. Institutionalists and constructivists often criticize neorealists for their failure to predict the continuing existence of the Cold War alliances. In this article, I apply the above theories to both NATO and the US–Japan Alliance, point out the flaws in various arguments, and assess the problems associated with the debate itself. Building on the theory of strategic restraint, I then provide an alternative explanation for the endurance of these alliances, by showing why secondary and potentially threatening states (or ‘sheep in wolf's clothing’) are willing to follow a hegemonic lead, and how institutions can help achieve that end. This illustrates an under‐examined function of alliances: dampening suspicion by bandwagoning.