Abstract

We experimentally implement a dynamic public‐good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free‐riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more complex behaviors than predicted by the welfare‐optimal equilibrium, such as noncut‐off behavior, lonely pioneers, and frequent switches of action.

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.