Abstract
Author(s): Lee, Jonghyuk | Advisor(s): Shih, Victor C | Abstract: This paper addresses the question of how bureaucratic incentives affect economic performance in China at the provincial level. This paper develops a novel model to measure promotion incentives of the Chinese provincial standing committee members from 1995 to 2015. Using machine learning to incorporate over 200 variables of individual features, this paper derives a predicted probability of political advancement (i.e. prior likelihood of promotion) as a proxy to evaluate officials’ career prospects. The empirical results show that Chinese provincial governments are likely to generate higher economic growth rates when composed of a greater proportion of officials facing intense competition in the promotion tournament. On the other hand, a higher proportion of provincial leaders whose careers are at a dead-end or on a fast track has no effect on the local economic development. Contrary to popular belief, better economic performance stem mainly from the career incentives of the rank-and-file standing committee members, not from those of the supreme leaders of the province, such as the party secretary and the governor.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.