Abstract

The 18th Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan in 2010 transferred powers to the country's provinces and removed articles inserted by the previous military regimes which facilitated military influence. However, the reform failed to reverse the material roots of the Pakistani military's structural dominance, especially its multi-billion-dollar business empire. Instead, it pushed the military to develop new ways of (re)producing its influence by strategically appropriating the separatist conflict in Balochistan as the most serious threat facing the country and one that required the military's continuing role in policymaking. These counter-processes rendered the constitutional reform inadequate and kept the ethnic conflict alive, while also enabling the military to perpetuate a militarised regime at the national level. Using primary evidence, the article shows how a civil-military institutional imbalance favouring the military can impede ethnic conflict resolution even when the constitution offers autonomy to ethnic groups.

Full Text
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