Ballot Structure, Political Corruption, and the Performance of Proportional Representation

Abstract

What is the relationship between ballot structure (the manner in which citizens cast their votes) and corruption related to the financing of politics? The author develops a principal agent—model which considers how differences in ballot structure may facilitate or impede attempts by parties to utilize the public administration as a source of electoral resources. Electoral systems which concentrate political career control in the hands of party leaders, such as closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) facilitate the use of the bureaucracy in this manner, whereas electoral systems that undermine party leader control, such as preferential-list proportional representation (PLPR), make it more difficult. The difference in the two systems rests with the degree of leverage enjoyed by party leaders vis-à-vis politically oriented bureaucrats. The capacity for favoritism under CLPR permits party leaders to reward militants who have engaged in risky behavior for the party; PLPR undercuts similar attempts to reward risky behavior.