Balancing board? The effects of board independence and capital on firms offering work‐family benefits

Abstract

While prior research demonstrates the strategic human resource (HR) advantages associated with offering work–family benefits (WFBs), firms continue to be reluctant in providing their employees with these benefits. Drawing on the corporate governance and stakeholder orientation literatures, this study examines the role of board independence and capital for WFBs being offered in publicly‐traded firms. Our results demonstrate that various director independence and capital attributes are related to the firm offering WFBs. Specifically, board directors who are outsiders, women, and holders of additional directorships, with their broad stakeholder orientation, increase the likelihood of WFBs being offered by the firm [Correction added on December 14, 2017, after first online publication: the preceding sentence has been updated to clarify the findings of the study.]. These findings are of importance to HR practitioners considering the influence that corporate boards can have on the firm's use of HR practices, such as WFBs, that affect all employees, not just the executives.