Balancing Acts: Jordan and the United States during the Johnson Administration

Abstract

From the onset of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1947, the White House consistently favoured a policy of limiting arms sales to the Middle East. American policymakers attempted to enhance regional stability and stem Soviet influence by restricting the flow of weapons to this volatile part of the world. President Lyndon Johnson’s advisors recommended that he depart from this traditional policy and develop a strategy of “arms balance,” which would provide an acceptable number of weapons to both Israel and Jordan. This new approach was crafted to address the criticism of the Israeli lobby and American Jewish constituents, who consistently pressured the White House to supply Israel with the latest in modern weaponry. The Johnson administration also sought to placate King Hussein, who threatened to seek Soviet assistance if the United States refused to provide sufficient arms to the Hashemite monarchy. Johnson’s shift to a policy of arms balance reflected the emergent view in Washington that Jordan served as a barrier to both Nasser’s ambitions and to the expansion of communism in the Middle East; however, it failed to achieve Johnson’s goal of preventing a regional war.