Abstract
Klein (2014) argues that the replication crisis in social psychology is due—at least in large part—to the tendency of psychological theories to be ill-specified. We disagree. First, we use both historical and contemporary examples to show that high-quality replication is possible even in the absence of a well-specified theory; and, second, we argue that it is typically auxiliary assumptions, rather than theories themselves, that need to be more clearly specified in order to understand the implications of a given replication effort.
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