Bad Faith: A Dilemma

Abstract

Leslie Stevenson has made a valuable contribution to the ongoing discussion in this journal of Sartre's concept of 'bad faith'.' He has the courage to advocate the heretical (but, as I see it, eminently sound) view that Sartre never intended the famous case of the waiter-the focus of so much recent attention in these pages-as an illustration of bad faith. Had Sartre intended it this way, he would surely have said so, and he could not have been clearer in explaining the point the case does illustrate in his view. More importantly, drawing upon key concepts in Being and Nothingness, Stevenson attempts to provide a clear Sartrean account of the phenomenon. I am in bad faith, according to Stevenson's analysis, when I reflectively deny what I pre-reflectively take to be true. It is this latter point that I wish to discuss. This seems a quite promising suggestion, after all. After careful reflection, however, I think we are forced to reject it-not as a misreading of Sartre, but as a philosophical indefensible account of had faith. I want to take a few moments now to set out my reasons for this Judgment. In the last sentence of his article, Stevenson wonders whether the position he has outlined 'is philosophically defensible-in particular whether the distinction between reflective and pre-reflective awareness can be made and used in the way that Sartre requires. ...'3 I think the answer to the question whether the distinction can be mnade is Yes, but that the answer to the question whether the distinction can be used as Stevenson wishes to use it is No. Neither Stevenson nor Sartre claims to provide us with a precise analysis of the nature of 'pre-reflective awareness'. Sartre says rather more on the subject than Stevenson does, but there is still much room (and need) for clarification. In any case, as I see it, we can take either a 'hard' view in interpreting this concept or a 'soft' view. The hard view will see the pre-reflective as a deeply submerged domain of awareness, accessible only with great difficulty to reflective consciousness. The soft view will see it as a sort of peripheral awareness, the contents of which are available with no extraordinary effort or specialised