Abstract
It appears to be common wisdom that the basic cause of Thailand's crisis is its extraordinarily weak financial institutions. The paper questions this proposition from an empirical viewpoint. It is well established that the long-term performance of Thailand's financial system is favorable. The insight from moral hazard indicators is unexpected regarding the bad banking proposition, although not compelling. Finally, the liberalization process produced inadequately addressed risks. However, this also applies to experienced and well-regulated foreign banks. It is argued that the facts provided can be better explained in a framework of system change than by bad banking in Thailand.
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