Abstract

Abstract This chapter tests the second central argument of the book: Members of Congress use informal channels of communication with the bureaucracy to represent controversial interests that would be costly for them to represent publicly. The chapter’s quantitative analyses test this argument across three issue areas (i.e., labor, homeland security, energy) using lawmakers’ records of communication with the US Departments of Labor, Homeland Security, and Energy. The results show that legislators contact agencies about policy more frequently when they face cross-pressures, a conflict between their party and constituency, on an issue. Critically, the results show that this pattern is particular to back-channel communication; the results are different when bill sponsorship is substituted for policy contact. These results suggest that members of Congress choose to represent contentious issues in the bureaucratic venue because it is less visible than the legislative process.

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