Back to the Problem of Self-Justification. Where Hegel and Feuerbach Left Off .

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this long excerpt, Bibler argues that, in Hegel’s logic, thinking devours the object—the Absolute is achieved—and therefore thinking itself disappears. Yet thinking necessarily involves being, even though it is expressed in a different logic. At this point, the inquiry shifts to the question about the interaction of various logics. Contrary to this, Bibler claims that no meta-logic is required when it comes to justifying the beginning of each logic. This issue was not explicated in Hegel; therefore, his logic has an end. Similarly, Hegel had no rationale for the beginning point of logic, because pure being and nothing do not contain contradictions. Feuerbach tried to introduce dialogue, but his dialogue is that of the thinker with himself, not a dialogue between “I” and “You”; therefore, it does not include the Other and, thus, is not a true dialogue. Rejecting this Duplicate, Feuerbach did not understand the role of the Interlocutor, and so his logic is also mono-logical. The difficulty lies in the attempt to introduce being into logic, and this is possible only if logic is formulated in a different way. Thus, Bibler proposes a different logic, a logic of being, which he interprets as the logic of non-knowledge, the logic of non-understanding. What escapes understanding is no other type of reasoning. For example, medieval reasoning based on religion and its explanations. In it, the world is understood not as object but as inherent in God. In modern-era European thought, when one thinks, one just as necessarily includes both what one understands and what one does not understand in one’s knowledge of the object, as Kant wrote: “The unconditional is located in things, because we do not know them.” In this regard, Bibler praises the logic of Nicholas of Cusa, who includes scientific ignorance in his explanations. The value of Descartes’ and Spinoza’s logics are also briefly examined here, along with the transition to justifying a new logic.