Abstract
AbstractIn this paper, I offer a quantitatively rich, historical perspective with which to consider Western Canada's recent return to private grain marketing. I assess how futures markets on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange (WGE) performed before the Canadian Wheat Board, and I consider the extent to which this performance contributed to the Canadian government's decision to create the Board. I conclude, despite significant agrarian dissatisfaction with private grain marketing on the WGE, the Canadian government ultimately proscribed futures trading because it was incompatible with the CWB model, which the Canadian government needed in order to stabilize farm incomes, particularly in the aftermath of the Great Depression.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
