Bachmann und Wittgenstein. Versuch einer Annäherung

Don DeLillo’s early novels explore the relationship between formal logic and literary form. In End Zone, DeLillo uses tautology as a linguistic tactic of diminishment to advance a larger aesthetic strategy of repleteness. The novel says less to show more. As a result, End Zone, like many of DeLillo’s other early novels, frequently represents states of silence and unspeakability. DeLillo’s early fiction shares these concerns with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, particularly the remarks on tautology, silence, and the limits of language in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In their conclusions, End Zone and the Tractatus analogously seek to undo themselves to overcome the inherent limitations of logic and language.

Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be divided into two main eras. They are the early period and the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico philosophicus has composed in the early period and Philosophical investigations have composed within the later period, which deals with the philosophy of language, mind and epistemology. Not only were the doctrines changed from early Wittgenstein’s thought to later Wittgenstein’s philosophy, the method was changed with the change of those doctrines. He combined logic and language in order to define the nature of the world. First, his aim was to understand the limitations of thoughts and through the limitations of thought, he wanted to understand the structures of language. The objective of this study is to identify the Object of Inquiry of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Textual analysis has been used as the method of this study. His philosophy was a critical explanation of language. He rejected that the structure of reality or the world could be determined the structures of language. He states that the structures of language could construct the world. He suggested that every language has its own logical structure. Wittgenstein’s early philosophy can be described from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The essence of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be summarized as following. A fact can be defined as a collection of atomic facts or states of affairs. Atomic facts can be defined as combinations of objects. Combinations of atomic facts can be defined as the world, there could be many re-combinations of those atomic facts, and it can be called as the change.

Wittgenstein's House reads Wittgenstein's his two main philosophical texts, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, in relation to an experience that intervened between them: his design and construction of the Stonborough-Wittgenstein house in Vienna. Arguing that the practice of architecture occupies not just a historical position between Wittgenstein's early and late philosophy, but a conceptual position as well, the book demonstrates that Wittgenstein's practice of architecture constitutes a fundamental component in the development of his philosophy of language from its early to late phases. The book advances the radical proposition that the field in which architecture and philosophy operate includes linguistic and spatial practices.

This paper considers some philosophical implications of a claim that language relates to the world not by the means of (re)presentation, but in actions, taken by humans. The enacted approach to language shifts the attention of a researcher from language structure to human embodied action and its comprehension. Considering the philosophical implications of this idea, we come to a conclusion that enacted understanding of action should reveal the gaps ­(blanks) in our cognition, appearing because of structural difference between our actions and language. Consequently, it shows how we can extend in action our knowledge of the world, limited by language. Thus, here I present an attempt to escape from the limits, put by Wittgenstein in his dictum: “the limits of the world are the limits of language”.

An essential feature of Wittgenstein's early philosophy of logic is the conjecture of a positive solution to the question of whether logical truth in first-order logic is decidable (Entscheidungsproblem). It is often argued that the proofs of a negative solution to the Entscheidungsproblem presented in the 1930s refuted Wittgenstein's early conception of logic. However, we argue Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic does not share the principles assumed by the proof strategies of those undecidability proofs. Thus, the undecidability proofs do not refute Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic based on its own convictions. Therefore, we provide a purely logical refutation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy of logic that does not depend on assumptions that he does not accept. Wittgenstein claimed that the logical properties of first-order logic are decidable based on patterns in a suitable notation for first-order logic. We explain why this conviction is mistaken.

ABSTRACTIn 1931 Wittgenstein wrote: ‘the limit of language manifests itself in the impossibility of describing the fact that corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence’. Here, Wittgenstein claims, ‘we are involved … with the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy’. This paper shows how this remark fits with Wittgenstein's early account of the substance of the world, his account of logic, and ultimately his view of philosophy. By contrast to the currently influential resolute reading of the Tractatus, the paper argues that the early Wittgenstein did not aim at destroying the idea of a limit of language, but that the notion lies at the very heart of Wittgenstein's early view. In doing so, the paper employs and defends the Kantian interpretation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy.

In the Preface to Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein distinguishes between two aspects of the relation of his later work to his early philosophy, and between two senses in which knowledge of his early work can help in the interpretation of his later philosophy. On the one hand, he suggests that his later philosophy can ‘be seen in the right light only...against the background’ of his ‘old way of thinking’. Presumably this is so because the later work develops further certain ideas that were present already in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and make Wittgenstein's philosophy a distinctive contribution to the tradition of philosophy. A proper grasp of the way in which Wittgenstein seeks to correct his early view of logic and language in his later philosophy requires understanding the development of his conception of philosophy and its methodology.

In this chapter I will discuss Wittgenstein’s views on self, meaning and world in an attempt to bring out the connections between self, language and the world within a transcendental framework. Wittgenstein has opted for a transcendental way of bringing out the connections between language and logic on the one hand and the world on the other. From his early philosophy in the Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1961a) and to his later philosophy in the Investigations (Wittgenstein 1953, 2009), he has pursued a method of understanding language and the world which can be called transcendental (Shwayder 1969: 66–70; Stenius 1960; Pradhan 2008). Though he calls his early philosophy transcendental, he calls his later philosophy grammatical (Wittgenstein 1953, 2009) in nature. However, we can consider Wittgenstein as a transcendental philosopher in general as he has given up the empiricist and the naturalist way of interpreting language and the world.

PART I INTRODUCTION Short Biography Wittgenstein and Theology? PART II WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY Philosophical Background 1. Descartes 2. Locke and Realism 3. The Early Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 4. Berkeley and Idealism Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy 1. Philosophical Investigations 2. On Certainty PART III WITTGENSTEIN AND THEOLOGY Wittgenstein and Christology 1. Nestorius (Locke and Realism) 2. Eutyches (Berkeley and Idealism) 3. Chalcedon and Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy Wittgenstein and the Theologian 1. The Theologian (Philosopher) of Glory 2. The Theologian (Philosopher) of the Cross 3. Contemporary Theologians Wittgenstein in Theological Practice 1. Clarification-not explanation, justification, or refutation 2. Scripture, Liturgy and Practice.

Almost from the beginning of his return to philosophy in Cambridge in 1929, Ludwig Wittgenstein was concerned not only with the relation of sentences or propositions to reality but also with the idea of someone's thinking or meaning or understanding something in a particular way. He also returned to the idea of a ‘limit’, this time to ‘the limit of language’. In the early parts of Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein takes up the question of how one can talk about ‘understanding’ or ‘not understanding’ a sentence. The implications of middle-period reflections on the impossibility of understanding language and meaning ‘from outside’ are illustrated and developed at many points and in many ways throughout Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein's remark that it is impossible to describe the fact that corresponds to a sentence without simply repeating the sentence is immediately followed by the observation that ‘this has to do with the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy’.

Aspect-seeing, I claim, involves reflection on concepts. It involves letting oneself feel how it would be like to conceptualize something with a certain concept, without committing oneself to this conceptualization. I distinguish between two kinds of aspect-perception:1. Preparatory: allows us to develop, criticize, and shape concepts. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of examining what would be the best way to conceptualize it.2. Non-Preparatory: allows us to express the ingraspability of certain experiences. It involves bringing a concept to an object for the purpose of showing—per impossible—what it would take to properly capture one’s experience. I demonstrate the usefulness of the two kinds of aspect perception in making conceptual judgments, and in making moral and aesthetic judgments.ReferencesSara Bachelard. On Euthanasia: Blindspots in the Argument from Mercy. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 19(2):131–40, 2002.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5930.00210PMid:12747357Avner Baz. What’s the Point of Seeing Aspects? Philosophical Investigations, 23(2):97–121, 2000.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9205.00116Avner Baz. On Learning from Wittgenstein, or What Does it Take to See the Grammar of Seeing Aspects? In W. Day Anew and V. J. Krebs, editors, Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, pages 227–48. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511750663.013Avner Baz. Seeing Aspects and Philosophical Difficulty. In M. McGinn and O. Kuusela, editors, The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, pages 697–713. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199287505.003.0031Stanley Cavell. The Availability of Wittgensteins Later Philosophy. In his Must We Mean What We Say?, pages 44–72. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969.Stanley Cavell. The Claim of Reason. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979.Bob Dent. Why I Wanted to Die: Bob Dents Last Words. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 16(1):19–32, 1999.Cora Diamond. Secondary Sense. In her The Realistic Spirit, pages 225–41. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991a.Cora Diamond. The Face of Necessity. In her The Realistic Spirit, pages 243–66. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991b.Richard Eldridge. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139164740Juliet Floyd. On Being Surprised: Wittgenstein on Aspect-Perception, Logic, and Mathematics. In W. Day and V. J. Krebs,editors, Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, pages 314–337. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.Geach, P.T. Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1957.Immanuel Kant. Critique of the Power of Judgment, translated by J.C. Meredith. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1952.John Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Hackett Publishing Co., Indianapolis, 1996.John McDowell. Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following. In S. Holtzman and C. M. Leich, editors, Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, pages 141–62. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981.Stephen Mulhall. Inheritance and Originality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.Jean-Paul Sartre. Nausea. New Directions, New York, 2007.David Seligman. Wittgenstein on Seeing Aspects and Experiencing Meanings. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 37(2): 205–17, 1976.http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107192Timothy Williamson. Vagueness. Routledge, London, 1994.Ludwig Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Routledge, London, 1922.Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell, Oxford, 3rd edition, 1958.Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Blue and Brown Books. Blackwell, Oxford, 2nd edition, 1969.Ludwig Wittgenstein. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology. Blackwell, Oxford, 1980.Ludwig Wittgenstein. Culture and Value. Blackwell, Oxford, 1998.

The article discusses attempts to develop a conception of language in opposition to metaphysics in the of Wittgenstein and of Heidegger. Both Wittgenstein and Heidegger worked in the field of with the intention to overcome metaphysics. However, each of them understood metaphysics differently, and it resulted in different conceptions of language. In the first part, the author presents the major themes of Wittgenstein's of language, among them his formulation of metaphysics. Even if the ,,first philosophy of Wittgenstein is radically different from his ,,second philosophy, his position on metaphysics is stable: metaphysical statements are statements which violate the boundaries of sense (Sinn). In the Tractatus Wittgenstein aims at finding the limits of the world, thought and language, as well as distinguishing between sense and nonsense. The conditions for a proposition's having sense have been explored by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus: they rest on the possibility of representation or picturing. According to him, names must have a reference/meaning (Bedeutung), but they can do so only in the context of a proposition which is held together by logical form. It follows that only the factual states of affairs, which can be pictured, can be by meaningful propositions. This means that what can be said are only the propositions of natural sciences, leaving out of the realm of sense a daunting number of statements which are made and used in language. First, there are the propositions of logic. These do not represent states of affairs, and the logical constants do not stand for objects. ,,My fundamental thought is that the logical constants do not represent. That the logic of the facts cannot be represented (Tractatus logico-philosophicus 4.0312). Tautologies and contradictions, the propositions of logic, are the limits of language and thereby the limits of the world. They do not picture anything and do not, therefore, have sense, they are senseless (sinnlos). Propositions which do have sense are bipolar; they refer to the truth-conditions drawn by the propositions of logic.

Ludwig Wittgenstein's conception of the role of objects in our philosophical understanding of the logic of our language is critical for his early philosophy in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. While the important connections between Heinrich Hertz's Principles of Mechanics and Wittgenstein's Tractatus have long been recognized, recent work by Jed Buchwald has deepened our knowledge of the importance of the object-orientation of Hertz's scientiac work in a manner that should also deepen our understanding of the nature of objects in the Tractatus. I will argue that there are important ontological links, involving “a certain physical scheme, one that had powerful implications for thinking as well as doing”, between Hertz's work and Wittgenstein's early philosophy.

Living Alone:Solipsism in Heart of Darkness David Rudrum ". . . As if I could read the darkness."Philosophical Investigations, §635 We live, as we dream—alone."1 This, Marlow's most eminently quotable aphorism, encapsulates a theme central to the outlook of modernism: what Virginia Woolf called "the loneliness which is the truth about things."2 This loneliness derives not from the absence of others—Marlow is surrounded by friends when he makes this assertion. It is a deeper condition brought about by recognizing the limits of selfhood, by confronting or being confronted by them. This condition is central to Marlow's narrative predicament: he attempts to fathom the enigmatic self that is Kurtz, to understand "the tempestuous anguish of his soul" (HoD, p. 246); he is led, by this attempt, to question the nature of his own self; and, finally, he tries to relay the impenetrable essence of both these selves to the "other minds" of his narratees on the yawl Nellie. As we shall see, Marlow concedes defeat in all three of these struggles. Heart of Darkness, then, is a novel beset by the limits of subjectivity. It is also a novel which foregrounds the limits of language. Marlow concludes that we live in isolation from one another after musing on the failure of language to communicate adequately, to facilitate intersubjective understanding: "it is impossible to convey the life-sensation of any given epoch of one's existence" (HoD, p. 172), he says. [End Page 409] Conveying the meaning of his narrative to others is repeatedly written off as unattainable, and on numerous occasions Marlow, presumably wrestling with sheer wordlessness, falls silent.3 Indeed, Marlow's narrative is peppered with words highlighting the limits of language: words like "inconceivable" and "unspeakable," which F. R. Leavis famously dismissed as "overworked." Leavis described Conrad's "adjectival insistence upon inexpressible and incomprehensible mystery" as "worse than supererogatory," "tending to cheapen the tone" to a point "little short of disastrous." He concluded that Conrad was "intent on making a virtue out of not knowing what he means."4 That Leavis—a critic who fetishized "the concrete presentment of incident, setting and image" through the concrete use of words—should have failed to grasp and to value the novel's brush with wordlessness, is unsurprising (Leavis, p. 208). Nor is it surprising that two of the episodes in the novel that most clearly encounter the limits of language—Kurtz's last words and Marlow's lie about them—were written off by Leavis as examples of Conrad having a "bad patch" (Leavis, p. 208). Yet it is nevertheless instructive that a novel that insists on its linguistic and communicative limits should thus have been misread. This article reads these two issues of the limits of language and the limits of subjectivity together. To do so is to invoke a philosophical position in which language, selfhood and worldhood are interrelated, and their limits coterminous—a position found in the early thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. I Like Marlow, Wittgenstein also sees the self as essentially isolated from other selves, and language as demarcating its limits. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the interconnected remarks "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" and "I am my world" delineate Wittgenstein's rethinking of the "egocentric predicament" in which, to paraphrase Marlow, we all live alone.5 This position entails a close relationship with solipsism: as Wittgenstein says, "what the solipsist means is quite correct" (TLP, 5.62)—which is not, of course, to suggest that solipsism itself is correct. The grammar of Marlow's assertion encapsulates this point. The card-carrying solipsist would assert "I live alone," but the loneliness that Marlow and Wittgenstein envisage is a [End Page 410] condition of our subjectivity that we all have in common, but cannot share. It is a transcendental solipsism. Nearly 300 years before Heart of Darkness was written, a poem by Robert Herrick anticipated some aspects of Marlow's assertion of transcendental solipsism: Dreames Here we are all, by day; By night w'are hurl'd By dreames, each one, into a sev'rall world.6 This poem makes explicit something left implicit in Marlow's...

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama Ludwigo Wittgensteino (1889–1951) filosofijos stilistika paties autoriaus paskelbtuose veikaluose Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), Filosofiniai tyrinėjimai (Philosophischen Untersuchungen, 1953) ir pomirtiniame pastabų rinkinyje Kultūra ir vertybė (Culture and Value, 1980)